In callCallbackForRequest of ConnectivityService.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure of the current SSID with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-9Android ID: A-161370134

Published at: November 10, 2020 at 08:15AM
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Visual Components (owned by KUKA) is a robotic simulator that allows simulating factories and robots in order toimprove planning and decision-making processes. Visual Components software requires a special license which can beobtained from a network license server. The network license server binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0) and listensfor packets over UDP port 5093. No authentication/authorization is required in order to communicate with theserver. The protocol being used is a property protocol by RMS Sentinel which provides the licensing infrastructurefor the network license server. RMS Sentinel license manager service exposes UDP port 5093 which provides sensitivesystem information that could be leveraged for further exploitation without any kind of authentication. Thisinformation includes detailed hardware and OS characteristics.After a decryption process, a textual protocol is found which contains a simple header with the requested command,application-identifier, and some arguments. The protocol leaks information regarding the receiving serverinformation, license information and managing licenses, among others.Through this flaw, attackers can retreive information about a KUKA simulation system, particularly, the version ofthe licensing server, which is connected to the simulator, and which will allow them to launch local simulationswith similar characteristics, further understanding the dynamics of motion virtualization and opening doors toother attacks (see RVDP#711 and RVDP#712 for subsequent vulnerabilities that compromise integrity andavailability).Beyond compromising simulations, Visual Components provides capabilities to interface with industrial machinery.Particularly, their PLC Connectivity feature ‘makes it easy’ to connect simulations with control systems usingeither the industry standard OPC UA or other supported vendor specific interfaces. This fills the gap of jumpingfrom simulation to real and enables attackers to pivot from the Visual Components simulator to robots or otherIndustrial Control System (ICS) devices, such as PLCs.

Published at: November 06, 2020 at 07:15AM
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Visual Components (owned by KUKA) is a robotic simulator that allows simulating factories and robots in order toimprove planning and decision-making processes. Visual Components software requires a special license which can beobtained from a network license server. The network license server binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0) and listensfor packets over UDP port 5093. No authentication/authorization is required in order to communicate with theserver. The protocol being used is a property protocol by RMS Sentinel which provides the licensing infrastructurefor the network license server. RMS Sentinel license manager service exposes UDP port 5093 which provides sensitivesystem information that could be leveraged for further exploitation without any kind of authentication. Thisinformation includes detailed hardware and OS characteristics.After a decryption process, a textual protocol is found which contains a simple header with the requested command,application-identifier, and some arguments. The protocol is vulnerable to DoS through an arbitrary pointerderreference. This flaw allows an attacker to to pass a specially crafted package that, when processed by theservice, causes an arbitrary pointer from the stack to be dereferenced, causing an uncaught exception thatterminates the service. This can be further contructed in combination with RVDP#710 which exploits an informationdisclosure leak, or with RVDP#711 for an stack-overflow and potential code execution.Beyond denying simulations, Visual Components provides capabilities to interface with industrial machinery andautomate certain processes (e.g. testing, benchmarking, etc.) which depending on the DevOps setup might beintegrated into the industrial flow. Accordingly, a DoS in the simulation might have higher repercusions, dependingon the Industrial Control System (ICS) ICS infrastructure.

Published at: November 06, 2020 at 07:15AM
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The frame touch module does not make validity judgments on parameter lengths when processing specific parameters,which caused out of the boundary when memory access.The vulnerability eventually leads to a local DOS on the device.

Published at: November 10, 2020 at 11:15AM
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The previous default setting for Airflow’s Experimental API was to allow all API requests without authentication, but this poses security risks to users who miss this fact. From Airflow 1.10.11 the default has been changed to deny all requests by default and is documented at https://bit.ly/2InLAtA. Note this change fixes it for new installs but existing users need to change their config to default `[api]auth_backend = airflow.api.auth.backend.deny_all` as mentioned in the Updating Guide: https://bit.ly/36nTcV7

Published at: November 10, 2020 at 11:15AM
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